I recently read “Famine in Somalia: Competing imperatives collective failures, 2011-2012”, which (as you may have guessed) picks apart the lead-up and response to the 2011-2012 famine in East Africa. It was fascinating, and I wanted to jot down three quick thoughts / takeaways from the book:
1. The famine was predicted. In fact, even the drought that set up the conditions for a potential famine was predicted. But the famine happened anyway. There were a number of reasons for this, chief among them the rise of Al-Shabaab, a fear of food-aid diversion, and a lack of coordination between remotely-managed disaster responses. But this points to the fact that it’s not only predicting disasters that we need to improve on. We need to consider how we can improve our responses to disasters in ways other than prediction.
2. The climate and disaster response community is already using some information about ENSO life-cycles in disaster management, but they could be doing much more. As the authors note, FEWSNET raised the alarm about a potential famine nearly a year in advance using information that La Niñas, which lead to drought in the Horn of Africa, often follow El Niños. We need to be incorporating this information into our “medium-term” preparedness, not just our disaster responses. For example, we could use this knowledge to know when we may need to pre-position food aid, or develop in-country networks for disaster response. The time it took to develop the in-country networks necessary was a major contributing factor to the famine. We could be using climate information to inform not only the delivery of food stock, but also for allocating time/money towards developing anticipatory in-country connections with key players ahead of an expected emergency.
3. One of the major themes of the book was a focus on bringing accountability to famines. I believe that as long as famines are treated as unforeseeable disasters, this will remain impossible. If, however, we move out of a disaster-response framework, and into a risk-reduction framework we may be able to make headway. If major droughts are viewed as an expected, recurring phenomena then a general preparedness may be reasonably expected. In this framework we need to begin focusing on how long we should expect between droughts. How severe will they be? By posing these questions publicly we can normalize the expectation of drought (and therefore of a planned response). This may provide political accountability for investments in institutions and infrastructure during non-crisis periods. Without a shift in the way we talk about food-security crises, we’re unlikely to see any change.